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ARTICLES
LETTERS OF CREDIT: DISHONOR WHEN A REQUIRED
DOCUMENT FAILS TO CONFORM TO THE SECTION
7-507(b) WARRANTY
Kerry L. Macintosh *
INTRODUCTION
Interest in letters of credit has intensified in recent years. The
unfortunate impact of the recent Iranian Revolution on international
business transactions, together with lesser commercial fiascoes, have
produced a spate of cases, which, in turn, have spawned a spate of law
review articles discussing the proper definition and application of
grounds for dishonoring a demand for payment under the letter of
credit. 2
One such ground for dishonor, however, remains virtually unno-
ticed. Under section 5-114 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), 3 the failure of a required document4 to conform to any one
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. B.A. Pomona College,
1978; J.D. Stanford Law School, 1982.
I would like to thank Associate Professor Robert Weisberg, of Stanford Law School, and Pro-
fessor Joann Henderson, of the University of Idaho College of Law, for their helpful comments and
suggestions regarding this article.
1. See, eg., Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 730 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984); Rockwell Int'l Sys. v.
Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d
10 (2d Cir. 1979); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
2. See, e.g., Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596 (1978);
Symons, Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and the Basis for Injunctive Relief, 54 TUL. L. REV.
338 (1980); Van Houten, Letters of Credit and Fraud: A Revisionist View, 62 CAN. B. REV. 371
(1984); Note, "Fraud in the Transaction ". Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian Revolution,
93 HARv. L. REV. 992 (1980); Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction as a Remedy for Fraud in U.CC
Section 5-114, 63 MINN. L. REV. 487 (1979); Note, Letters of Credit: A Question of Honor, 16
N.Y.U. J. OF IN'r'L L. & POL. 799 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Question of Honor]; Com-
ment, The Independence Rule in Standby Letters of Credit, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1985).
3. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1978).
4. The term "document" is used in two different senses in the U.C.C. "Document," as it is
used in Article Five of the U.C.C., is defined as "any paper including document of title, security,
invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like." Id. § 5-103(l)(b). Within Article Seven, "docu-
ment" has the narrower meaning of "document of title." Id. § 7-102(l)(e). The term "document of
title" includes:
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of the three transfer warranties of section 7-5075 justifies dishonor.
This article will focus on the second of these three warranties, section
7-507(b):
Where a person negotiates or transfers a document of title for value
otherwise than as a mere intermediary under the next following section,
then unless otherwise agreed he warrants to his immediate purchaser
only in addition to any warranty made in selling the goods ....
(b) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair its
validity or worth.
6
What is the content of the section 7-507(b) warranty? Under the
language of section 5-114, when does the section 7-507(b) warranty
operate as a ground for dishonor? Finally, what are the practical and
conceptual consequences of the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor?
Before addressing these questions, this article will supply necessary
background by discussing the independence of the issuer's obligation
under the letter of credit, and fraud as the most widely analyzed and
employed ground for dishonor under section 5-114.
In aid of this discussion, the following introduction to the basic
letter of credit transaction is provided. 7 Suppose a seller and buyer
enter into a contract for the sale of goods. If they are dealing at a
distance, the seller may be uneasy about shipping his goods into the
bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt or order for the delivery of
goods, and also any other document which in the regular course of business or financing is
treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold
and dispose of the document and the goods it covers.
Id. § 1-201(15).
To avoid confusion, this article will utilize the term "document" to refer to a document within
the meaning of Article Five, and "document of title" to refer to a document within the meaning of
Article Seven.
5. Id. § 7-507.
6. Section 7-507(a) contains a warranty that the document of title which has been negotiated or
transferred is "genuine," that is, free of forgery or counterfeiting. Id. § 1-201(18). Since § 5-114(2)
expressly allows dishonor where a required document is forged, the inclusion of failure to conform to
the § 7-507(a) warranty as a further ground for dishonor seemingly adds little to the content of § 5-
114.
Section 7-507(c) contains a warranty that negotiation or transfer of the document of title is
rightful and fully effective with respect to the title to the document and the goods it represents.
Unlike § 7-507(a), this warranty may provide the basis for an additional ground for dishonor which
is distinct from the other grounds stated in § 5-114(2). Investigation of this possibility is beyond the
scope of this article. However, to the extent the § 7-507(c) warranty overlaps with the § 7-507(b)
warranty, it will be briefly discussed in this article. See infra note 40.
7. The letter of credit transaction outlined here involves a sale of goods. A letter of credit
which finances a sale of goods has been termed a "traditional" letter of credit. Comment, supra note
2, at 219. The letter of credit has many other uses. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-1, at 708-09 (2d ed. 1980).
[Vol. 6:1I
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buyer's jurisdiction without any guaranty of payment. 8 Accordingly,
he instructs the buyer to obtain a letter of credit from an "issuer": a
bank or other person who issues letters of credit. 9 The seller will be a
"beneficiary" of the credit: that is, a person who is entitled under its
terms to draw or demand payment.10 The buyer will be a "cus-
tomer": that is, a person who causes an issuer to issue a credit.1" By
issuing the letter of credit, the issuer engages to honor drafts or other
demands for payment made by the beneficiary, upon compliance with
the conditions specified in the credit.1 2 In a sale of goods transaction,
the conditions typically will include presentation of a document of
title, an invoice, and a certificate of insurance covering the goods to be
sold. Upon presentation of complying documents, the issuer will
honor the seller's demand for payment of the purchase price. The
buyer, in turn, will then reimburse the issuer.13
I. THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE
Under section 5-114(1), the issuer "must honor a draft or de-
For example, the so-called "standby" letter of credit may be issued to secure a performance obliga-
tion under a contract. Default in performance triggers the issuer's obligation to pay. Id. at 709.
Only "traditional" letters of credit will be discussed in this article. Section 7-507 warranties
relate to documents of title; documents of title evidence entitlement to goods. Thus, there can be no
§ 7-507(b) ground for dishonor in a letter of credit transaction unless goods are involved.
8. A simple documentary sale would be sufficient to protect the seller from the possibility that
the buyer will obtain possession of the goods without having paid for them. J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 7, § 18-1, at 705. In such a sale, the seller ships the goods to the buyer, perhaps
forwarding a negotiable document of title covering the goods, together with a sight draft drawn on
the buyer in the amount of the purchase price, through banking channels. Upon payment of the
sight draft, the buyer is entitled to receive the document of title, which then may be exchanged for
the goods.
The documentary sale does not solve other concerns which may plague the seller in a long-
distance transaction, however. If the buyer simply refuses to honor the sight draft after the goods
arrive at their destination, he will not obtain possession of the goods, but the seller will be confronted
with the potentially difficult task of reselling, storing, or reshipping the goods at a distance, and in a
location which may be unfamiliar or even foreign. Moreover, if the buyer's refusal to pay constitutes
a breach of contract, the seller will be put in a position where he may have to go to the expense and
trouble of suing the buyer in a faraway or foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 706. The letter of credit device
softens these concerns by introducing the promise of a bank or other solvent third party that the
seller will be paid so long as the conditions specified in the credit are met.
9. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(c) (1978).
10. Id. § 5-103(l)(d).
11. Id. § 5-103(12)(g).
12. Id. § 5-103(l)(a).
13. The customer's duty to reimburse the issuer is governed by § 5-114(3), which provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or demand for payment is enti-
tled to immediate reimbursement of any payment made under the credit and to be put in effectively
available funds not later than the day before maturity of any acceptance made under the credit."
1986]
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mand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant
credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the
underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer
and the beneficiary." Section 5-114(1) reflects a basic principle of let-
ter of credit law: the obligation of the issuer to pay is independent of
the underlying transaction between the customer and the benefici-
ary. 1 4 The importance of this independence principle is readily ex-
plained. The primary purpose of the letter of credit is to assure the
beneficiary of prompt payment. 15 If payment were dependent upon
the vicissitudes of the underlying transaction, the beneficiary would
have little incentive to utilize the letter of credit device.
A. Fraud as an Exception to the Independence Principle
Despite the importance of the independence principle, it is not an
absolute. Before the U.C.C. was enacted, the courts had demon-
strated a willingness to soften the principle in extreme cases. Sztejn v.
J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. 16 is the seminal case. There, a buyer
who had caused a letter of credit to be issued in favor of the seller
sought to restrain the issuer from making payment, alleging that the
seller had intentionally shipped fifty crates of rubbish in place of the
fifty crates of bristles called for in the underlying contract. The docu-
ments presented to the issuer stated that bristles had been shipped,
thereby complying on their face with the letter of credit's terms. Nev-
ertheless, the Sztejn court denied a motion to dismiss the buyer's com-
plaint. It reasoned as follows:
No hardship will be caused by permitting the bank to refuse pay-
ment where fraud is claimed, where the merchandise is not merely infer-
ior in quality but consists of worthless rubbish, where the draft and the
accompanying documents are in the hands of one who stands in the same
position as the fraudulent seller, where the bank has been given notice of
the fraud before being presented with the drafts and documents for pay-
ment, and where the bank itself does not wish to pay pending an adjudi-
cation of the rights and obligations of the other parties. While the
primary factor in the issuance of the letter of credit is the credit standing
of the buyer, the security afforded by the merchandise is also taken into
account. . . . Although the bank is not interested in the exact detailed
performance of the sales contract, it is vitally interested in assuring itself
14. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 18-2, at 711-12.
15. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 397, 146 N.E. 636, 639
(1925).
16. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
[VCol. 6:1
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that there are some goods represented by the documents.17
The fraud exception to the independence principle which was an-
nounced in Sztejn was later codified' 8 in section 5-114:
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face
to comply with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in
fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a docu-
ment of title (Section 7-507) or of a certificated security (Section 8-306)
or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction:
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good
faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification
from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the
face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin
such honor. 19
Under the language of section 5-114(2)(b), the presence of fraud
gives the issuer the option to honor or dishonor the demand for pay-
ment, so long as it acts in good faith. Moreover, the customer may
also effect dishonor by bringing an action seeking an injunction
against payment.
The drafters of section 5-114 left the critical terms "fraudulent"
and "fraud in the transaction" undefined. Much scholarly attention
has been focused on this interpretive problem. Recently, Symons has
17. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
18. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 18-6, at 736; Symons, supra note 2, at 354;
Comment, supra note 2, at 227. Other writers have suggested that § 5-114(2) extends rather than
codifies Sztejn. Characterizing Sztejn as a case involving forged or fraudulent documents, these writ-
ers argue that § 5-114(2) added a new ground for dishonor by including the language "fraud in the
transaction." See 2 R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 762 (2d ed. 1983); Harfield, supra note 2, at 605. This argument is not entirely persuasive. To
the extent the documents presented in Sztejn deliberately misrepresented the nature of the goods
shipped, they may be characterized as fraudulent. However, the Sztejn court also used language
which indicates that it viewed the problem before it as one of "fraud in the transaction": "[The
party demanding payment] should not be heard to complain because [the issuer] is not forced to pay
the draft accompanied by documents covering a transaction which it has reason to believe isfraudu-
lent." Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (emphasis added).
19. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (emphasis added). Subpart (a) of § 5-114(2), omitted above, requires
the issuer to honor a demand for payment, regardless of fraud, if:
honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has
taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances which would make it a
holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to
whom a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide purchaser
of a certificated security (Section 8-302).
For purposes of this article, it will henceforth be assumed that the special circumstances enu-
merated in § 5-114(2)(a) do not apply.
1986]
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suggested that dishonor should be permitted whenever an intentional
fraud has been perpetrated.20 In other words, fraud is to be inter-
preted as meaning common law fraud, which Symons defines as a
false representation knowingly or recklessly made with the intention
of inducing another to rely thereon.2' For example, dishonor would
be permitted if the beneficiary of a letter of credit, knowing that only
forty-nine crates of bristles had been shipped, presented a bill of lad-
ing22 which stated that fifty crates of bristles had been shipped. Other
writers have found this interpretation of fraud to be persuasive. 23
On the other hand, Harfield has argued in favor of an "egregious
fraud" standard for allowing dishonor.24 Harfield accepts Sztejn as a
case in which dishonor was justified. 25 Referring back to the facts of
Sztejn, dishonor presumably would be allowed under the egregious
fraud standard if the beneficiary, knowing that fifty crates of rubbish
had been shipped, presented a bill of lading which stated that fifty
crates of bristles had been shipped. In other words, simple intent to
deceive is not sufficient; it is the extreme or outrageous nature of the
fraud that is determinative.2 6
Whatever the outcome of the scholarly debate between propo-
nents of the intentional fraud and egregious fraud standards, it is evi-
dent that many courts recite the latter.27 Their phraseology is varied,
20. Symons, supra note 2, at 339.
21. Id. at 345.
22. A bill of lading is a document of title. U.C.C. § 1-201(15) (1978). It is defined as "a
document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of
transporting or forwarding goods." Id. § 1-201(6).
23. See 6 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 5-114:09, at 193 (1982);
Note, A Question of Honor, supra note 2, at 811.
24. Harfield, supra note 2, at 614-15; accord, 2 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 18, at 762; Justice,
Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations-Part 2, 94 BANKING L.J. 493, 498-501 (1977).
25. Harfield, supra note 2, at 602.
26. Consider the illustration provided by one proponent of the egregious fraud standard:
For example, a claim that paper does not, in fact, have the tensile strength, or that
grapes or sugar are not, in fact, of the quality specified in an invoice does not furnish a valid
basis for enjoining the payment of a draft presented with the invoice. On the other hand, if a
discrepancy with respect to quality is so great that the goods delivered are not, in fact, the
kind of goods described in the documents, the discrepancy may constitute fraud. For exam-
ple, a bank may be enjoined from paying a draft if the accompanying documents purport to
cover manila hemp but actually cover rags.
Justice, supra note 24, at 503 (footnotes omitted).
27. See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32 (Colo. 1981);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d 562 (1977);
Stringer Constr. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 102 I11. App. 3d 919, 430 N.E.2d 1 (1981); First Arling-
ton Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 11. App. 3d 802, 413 N.E.2d 1288 (1980); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l
Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa.
[Vol. 6:1
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but the substance is always the same: "An injunction against honor
. . .should be limited to situations where the wrongdoing of the ben-
eficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate pur-
poses of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer
be served"; 28 "[the fraud] must be of such an egregious nature as to
vitiate the entire underlying transaction"; 29 "A court of equity has the
limited duty of 'guaranteeing that [the beneficiary] not be allowed to
take unconscientious advantage of the situation and run off with
plaintiff's money on a pro forma declaration which has absolutely no
basis in fact.' "30
Therefore, in many jurisdictions, the fraud exception to the inde-
pendence principle remains narrow. A model transaction will illus-
trate. Suppose a seller and buyer enter into a contract for the sale of
100 bushels of Washington apples, and the buyer causes its bank to
issue a letter of credit in the seller's favor. Further, suppose the seller
presents to the issuer conforming documents representing that 100
bushels of Washington apples have been shipped, together with a de-
mand for payment, in full knowledge that a small but not insignificant
percentage of the apples are wormy, and will certainly be unaccept-
able to the buyer. This behavior does not amount to conduct so ex-
treme as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction; accordingly, in
jurisdictions adopting the egregious fraud standard, even if the issuer
and buyer are aware of the defect, honor will not be excused and can-
not be enjoined. In such jurisdictions, the independence principle
slumbers unsuspectingly on, virtually untouched by section 5-
114(2)--at least, for the moment.
II. FAILURE TO CONFORM TO THE SECTION 7-507(b) WARRANTY
AS A GROUND FOR DISHONOR
So much scholarly and judicial attention has been lavished on
fraud as a ground for dishonor, that the uninitiated might believe it
343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975); GATX Leasing Corp. v. DBM Drilling Corp., 657 S.w.2d 178 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1983). But see Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (1 lth Cir.
1982); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); NMC Enters., Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
28. Stringer Constr. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 102 Ill. App. 3d 919, 925, 430 N.E.2d 1, 6
(1981) (citation omitted).
29. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 39 (Colo. 1981).
30. Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25
(1975) (quoting Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 999 (N.D.
Ga. 1973)).
1986]
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was the only such ground specified in section 5-114(2). Such is not
the case. Under section 5-114(2), the failure of a required document
to conform to the three section 7-507 warranties also justifies dis-
honor. The task of this article is to analyze the section 7-507(b)
ground for dishonor. As a first step, the content of the section 7-
507(b) warranty must be defined.
A. Defining the Content of the Section 7-507(b) Warranty
What does a person promise when he warrants under section 7-
507(b) "that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair [the
document of title's] validity or worth"? Unfortunately, extensive re-
search produced no cases interpreting section 7-507(b).
Section 7-507 itself was modeled after similar provisions in three
prior uniform acts:31 section 36 of the Uniform Sales Act (U.S.A.); 32
section 44 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (U.W.R.A.);33
and section 35 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act (U.B.L.A.). 3 4 Sec-
31. U.C.C. § 7-507, Official Comment.
32. U.S.A. § 36 (act withdrawn 1951). This section provided:
A person who for value negotiates or transfers a document of title by indorsement or
delivery, including one who assigns for value a claim secured by a document of title unless a
contrary intention appears, warrants:
(a) That the document is genuine;
(b) That he has a legal right to negotiate or transfer it;
(c) That he has knowledge of no fact which would impair the validity or worth of the
document, and
(d) That he has a right to transfer the title to the goods and that the goods are mer-
chantable or fit for a particular purpose, whenever such warranties would have been implied
if the contract of the parties had been to transfer without a document of title the goods
represented thereby.
33. U.W.R.A. § 44 (act withdrawn 1951). This section provided:
A person who for value negotiates or transfers a receipt by indorsement or delivery,
including one who assigns for value a claim secured by a receipt, unless a contrary intention
appears, warrants
(a) That the receipt is genuine,
(b) That he has a legal right to negotiate or transfer it,
(c) That he has knowledge of no fact which would impair the validity or worth of the
receipt, and
(d) That he has a right to transfer the title to the goods and that the goods are mer-
chantable or fit for a particular purpose whenever such warranties would have been implied,
if the contract of the parties had been to transfer without a receipt the goods represented
thereby.
34. U.B.L.A. § 35 (act withdrawn 1951). This section provided:
[Vol. 6:1
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tion 114 of the Federal Bills of Lading Act also is similar.35 Each of
these provisions contains a warranty analogous to the section 7-507(b)
warranty. But case authority interpreting these analogous warranties
is virtually non-existent. 36 Only one such case was found: Stanford
Seed Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. 37 At issue in Stanford Seed was a
negotiable warehouse receipt covering 60,000 pounds of perennial rye
grass seed. The receipt represented on its face that it had been issued
in return for seed delivered to the warehouseman by Balfour, Guthrie
& Co., Ltd. When the warehouseman filed a bankruptcy petition; the
A person who negotiates or transfers for value a bill by indorsement or delivery, includ-
ing one who assigns for value a claim secured by a bill, unless a contrary intention appears,
warrants
(a) That the bill is genuine,
(b) That he has a legal right to transfer it,
(c) That he has knowledge of no fact which would impair the validity or worth of the
bill, and
(d) That he has a right to transfer the title to the goods, and that the goods are mer-
chantable or fit for a particular purpose whenever such warranties would have been implied,
if the contract of the parties had been to transfer without a bill the goods represented thereby.
In the case of an assignment of a claim secured by a bill, the liability of the assignor shall
not exceed the amount of the claim.
35. 49 U.S.C. app. § 114 (1982). This section provides:
A person who negotiates or transfers for value a bill by indorsement or delivery, unless a
contrary intention appears, warrants
(a) That the bill be genuine,
(b) That he has a legal right to transfer it;
(c) That he has knowledge of no fact which would impair the validity or worth of the
bill;
(d) That he has a right to transfer the title to the goods, and that the goods are mer-
chantable or fit for a particular purpose whenever such warranties would have been implied if
the contract of the parties had been to transfer without a bill the goods represented thereby.
36. Samuel Williston was the principal drafter of the U.S.A., U.W.R.A., and U.B.L.A. Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Commercial Acts
70, 185, 213 [1910]. His treatise on the law of sales includes a discussion of § 36 of the U.S.A.;
unfortunately, it provides no guidance as to the meaning of § 36(c). S. WILLISTON, THE LAW Gov-
ERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 431, 432
(1909).
Williston does mention that § 36 of the U.S.A. follows § 115 of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. Id. at § 431 n.43. Section 115(4) creates a warranty of "no knowledge of any fact which
would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless." J. CRAWFORD, THE NEGOTIA-
BLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 115(4) (2d ed. 1902). By contrast, § 36(c) of the U.S.A., and § 7-507(b)
of the U.C.C., contain warranties against knowledge which would "impair the .. .worth of the
document." The difference in degree between utter valuelessness and mere impairment of worth
makes § 115(4) a poor interpretive aid for either § 36(c) of the U.S.A. or § 7-507(b) of the U.C.C.
Also, since § 115(4) applies to negotiable instruments, rather than documents of title, cases interpret-
ing § 115(4) are not helpful in determining which facts concerning the underlying goods would
impair the validity or worth of a document of title.
37. 27 Misc. 2d 147, 208 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
1986]
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then holder of the receipt sued Balfour, alleging that Balfour never
delivered any seed to the warehouseman, and that there never was
any seed in the warehouse to cover the receipt. On these allegations,
the Stanford Seed court denied Balfour's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action, stating:
If it is true, as we must assume it is on this motion that Balfour did not
deliver any seed to the warehouseman where, on the face of the ware-
house receipt [the warehouseman] states that it did . . . it follows...
that Balfour had knowledge of a fact which would impair the validity or
worth of the receipt. This would constitute a violation of section 44 of
the Uniform Warehouse Receipt Act . ... 38
Assuming that the analogous section 7-507(b) warranty may be
similarly interpreted, Stanford Seed suggests that the section 7-507(b)
ground for dishonor may function, at a minimum, to allow dishonor
where there is knowledge that no goods stand behind a document of
title, contrary to representations on the face of the document of title.
To this extent, the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor is reminiscent
of the egregious fraud ground for dishonor.
However, there is nothing in Stanford Seed, nor in the language
of section 7-507(b), to suggest that knowledge of a fact impairing the
validity or worth of the document of title is limited to knowledge that
there are no goods whatsoever. A document of title simply represents
rights in goods.39 Logically, any fact which affects the worth of the
goods covered by the document of title should affect the worth of the
document of title itself. Thus, a person who transfers a document of
title knowing the goods it represents are defective has knowledge of a
fact which might impair the worth of the document of title. Further,
a misrepresentation of the actual nature or number of the goods cov-
ered by the document of title might affect the worth of the document
of title. Thus, a person who transfers a document of title knowing the
goods it represents are fewer in number or of a different kind than
stated in the document of title may have knowledge of a fact which
impairs the worth of the document of title.4° Finally, it appears that
the language of section 7-507(b) places no limitation on the degree to
which the worth of the document of title must be impaired. Thus, a
38. Id. at 150-51, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
39. See U.C.C. 1-201(15) (1978).
40. Under § 7-507(c), a person who negotiates or transfers a document of title warrants "that
his negotiation or transfer is rightful and fully effective with respect to the title to the document and
the goods it represents." Id. § 7-507(c). If the goods are different in nature or fewer in number than
is represented on the face of the document of title, arguably a transfer of the document of title is not
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relatively minor defect or misrepresentation may be sufficient to im-
pair the worth of a document of title.4'
B. Interpreting Section 5-114(2)
The next step is to analyze the language of section 5-114(2),
which creates the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor. Section 5-
114(2) allows dishonor when "a required document does not in fact
conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a docu-
ment of title (Section 7-507)." Several interpretations of this ambigu-
ous language are possible.
As a starting point, one could assume that the language "warran-
ties made on negotiation or transfer" limits dishonor to situations in
which a section 7-507 warranty is actually made, and then breached.
If such is the case, a question immediately suggests itself: warranties
made to whom?
Since the decision to honor or dishonor rests directly with the
issuer, and indirectly with the customer (through the device of an in-
junction), it seems reasonable to conclude that the breach of a section
7-507 warranty must directly concern one of these two parties in or-
der to constitute an effective ground for dishonor. Thus, one possibil-
ity is that the drafters of section 5-114 intended to allow dishonor
fully effective with respect to title to the goods it represents. To this extent, there is a potential for
overlap between the § 7-507(b) and § 7-507(c) warranties.
Simon v. Estate of Allen, 497 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843
(1974), lends support to this hypothesis. There, the transferee of warehouse receipts covering bales
of cotton discovered that 7,459 bales represented by the receipts were missing from the warehouse at
the time the receipts were transferred to him. It was held that the transferor of the receipts had
breached the § 7-507(c) warranty under these circumstances. Id. at 804.
The § 7-507(c) warranty remains a narrower ground for dishonor than the § 7-507(b) warranty,
since it does not apply where there are defects in the goods represented by the document of title. It is
broader since it does not require the person negotiating or transferring the document of title to have
knowledge of the discrepancy between the goods and the document of title in order for a breach to
occur. Of course, under either the § 7-507(b) or the § 7-507(c) ground for dishonor, the same diffi-
culties in construing the ambiguous language of § 5-114(2) apply. See infra text accompanying notes
42-55.
41. There are breaches of the underlying contract for sale between the buyer and seller which,
even if known, will not impair the validity or worth of the document of title within the meaning of
§ 7-507(b). Suppose the seller ships non-defective goods, which conform to the description of their
nature and quantity provided on the face of the document of title. In such a case, there is no dispar-
ity between the worth of the document of title, and the worth of the underlying goods, for the goods
are not defective, and they are what they are represented to be. Nevertheless, the seller may have
breached a warranty. For example, the goods may not be fit for the buyer's particular purpose, in
violation of a § 2-315 warranty. See generally U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978). Or, the goods may not have
certain characteristics or performance capabilities attributed to them by the seller (but not reflected
in the document of title description), in violation of a § 2-313 warranty. See generally id. § 2-313.
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where a section 7-507 warranty is made to the issuer, or to the cus-
tomer, and breached.
There are two difficulties with this interpretation. First, a person
who negotiates or transfers a document of title makes the section 7-
507 warranties to his immediate purchaser only.42 Suppose the bene-
ficiary first makes a demand for payment on a confirming bank,43 ne-
gotiating the document of title required under the letter of credit.
Since "purchase" is defined to include taking by negotiation, 44 the
confirming bank may be the "immediate purchaser" of the document
of title within the meaning of section 7-507.45 Moreover, the confirm-
ing bank itself, upon transfer or negotiation of the document of title to
the issuer, makes only an intermediary's warranty46 of good faith and
authority.47 Since no section 7-507 warranties were made to the is-
suer or customer, the beneficiary has insulated itself from the section
7-507 ground for dishonor by the simple device of transferring the
document of title through banking channels. 48
Second, section 7-507 stipulates that its warranties are made
when the document of title is negotiated or transferred for value. 49 At
the time when the issuer is deciding whether to honor the demand for
payment under the letter of credit, or the customer is seeking an in-
junction against honor, the beneficiary (or other claimant) presuma-
bly has not yet negotiated or transferred the document of title to the
42. Id. § 7-507.
43. "Confirming bank" is defined as a bank which engages either that it will itself honor a
credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third
bank. Id. § 5-103(l)(0.
44. Id. § 1-201(32).
45. "Purchaser" is defined as a person who takes by purchase. Id. § 1-201(33).
46. Id. § 5-111(2).
47. Id. § 7-508.
48. This result might be disputed by some scholars. Squillante and Fonseca argue that where
an intermediary is involved, the transferee of the document of title purchases it from the one who
entrusted it, and not from the intermediary, so that the warranty of § 7-507 is not impaired. The
only support offered for this conclusion, however, is that the authors "cannot believe that one can
escape warranties by using an intermediary." 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, THE LAW OF MOD-
ERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 9:59, at 476 n.88 (rev. ed. 1981).
49. "Value" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1978):
Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections
(Sections 3-303, 4-208 and 4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the extension of immedi-
ately available credit whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a chargeback is pro-
vided for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim; or
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase; or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
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issuer, nor has value, in the form of payment under the letter of
credit, 50 yet flowed to the beneficiary. Therefore, the very section 7-
507 warranties which the issuer or customer may wish to assert as
grounds for dishonor will not yet have come into existence, and dis-
honor for breach of those warranties will be impossible.
It appears that interpreting section 5-114(2) to allow dishonor
only where a section 7-507 warranty is actually made to an issuer or
customer, and then breached, creates a ground for dishonor which is
not only inconsistent in its application, but also completely non-func-
tional. A second possible interpretation is that section 5-114(2) allows
dishonor only where a section 7-507 warranty is actually made to
some random individual or entity during the process of transferring
the document of title, and breached. Although this second interpreta-
tion eliminates the problems discussed above, it engenders new ones.
As was the case with the first interpretation, the second interpre-
tation inserts an element of arbitrariness into the section 7-507 ground
for dishonor. It has been noted that the document of title cannot have
been negotiated or transferred for value to the issuer or the customer
at the critical moment when the demand for payment under the letter
of credit is made. But, whether the document of title has been negoti-
ated or transferred for value to any other person, thereby creating the
section 7-507 warranties, depends on whether any other person has
been included in the chain of transfer from the beneficiary to the is-
suer and customer. In other words, whereas presentation of the docu-
ment of title indirectly through banking channels is sufficient to
50. Actually, none of the definitions of "value" contained in § 1-201(44) fit neatly in the con-
text of the letter of credit transaction. The letter of credit contract between the issuer and the
customer obligates the issuer to honor the beneficiary's demand for payment, upon satisfaction of
certain conditions. Thus, the issuer "acquires" the document of title when it performs under the
letter of credit contract by giving the beneficiary money.
Given this background, it does not seem accurate to say that the issuer "acquires" the docu-
ment of title in return for a binding commitment to extend credit, or an extension of credit. Id. § 1-
201(44)(a). It is the beneficiary's act of drawing upon credit already extended him under the letter of
credit contract which triggers acquisition of the document of title. Nor does the issuer "acquire" the
document of title as security for or in satisfaction of some pre-existing claim against the beneficiary,
id. § 1-201(44)(b), or by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase. Id. § 1-
201(44)(c).
It is perhaps most accurate to say that the issuer "acquires" the document of title in return for
any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract, since money surely qualifies as such consid-
eration. Id. § 1-201(44)(d). However, to the extent § 1-201(44)(d) suggests that the value be given
as consideration for a contract, its application also seems inappropriate, since the issuer is not "ac-
quiring" the document of title pursuant to some simple contract of sale between it and the
beneficiary.
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insulate the beneficiary from the section 7-507 ground for dishonor
under the first interpretation of section 5-114, presentation of the doc-
ument of title directly to the issuer should be sufficient to insulate the
beneficiary from the section 7-507 ground for dishonor under the sec-
ond interpretation of section 5-114.
There is a still more serious objection to the second interpreta-
tion, which may be raised against the first interpretation as well. Sec-
tion 5-114(2) makes specific reference to section 7-507 warranties.
However, the Federal Bills of Lading Act (F.B.L.A.)51 preempts Arti-
cle Seven whenever it applies.5 2 The F.B.L.A. applies to:
Bills of lading issued by any common carrier for the transportation
of goods in any Territory of the United States, or the District of Colum-
bia, or from a place in a State to a place in a foreign country, or from a
place in one State to a place in another State, or from a place in one State
to a place in the same State through another State or foreign country,
shall be governed by this chapter. 53
In other words, if section 5-114(2) requires section 7-507 warran-
ties actually to be made, there will be no section 7-507 warranties, and
no section 7-507 ground for dishonor, whenever the letter of credit
transaction involves a bill of lading used in interstate commerce, or in
an international export transaction. Since the letter of credit device is
most useful when the parties are dealing at a distance, 54 the result of
such an interpretation is to eliminate the section 7-507 ground for
dishonor altogether in many letter of credit transactions. Moreover,
because the F.B.L.A. includes a provision whereby a person who ne-
gotiates or transfers a bill of lading makes essentially the same war-
ranties as those contained in section 7-507,55 the distinction drawn
between letter of credit transactions which involve bills of lading sub-
ject to the F.B.L.A., and those which do not, is irrational.
If one discards the staring assumption that section 5-114(2) lim-
its dishonor to cases where a section 7-507 warranty is actually made,
and breached, a third interpretation is possible. Section 5-114(2)
speaks of "the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a docu-
ment of title (Section 7-507)." Perhaps this language may be inter-
preted as a shorthand reference to the section 7-507 warranties, rather
51. 49 U.s.c. app. §§ 81-124 (1982).
52. U.C.C. § 7-103 (1978).
53. 49 U.S.C. app. § 81 (1982).
54. See supra note 8.
55. 49 U.S.C. app. § 114 (1982), supra note 35.
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than as a requirement that section 7-507 warranties actually be made.
Thus, the issuer would be entitled to dishonor, or the customer to
seek an injunction, whenever a document is presented which fails to
conform to the content of a section 7-507 warranty, regardless of
whether any section 7-507 warranty is actually made, or to whom it is
made. On balance, this third interpretation seems most attractive. It
eliminates the paradox which results if dishonor is allowed for breach
of a warranty that, by definition, cannot yet have been made. It also
avoids arbitrary application of the section 7-507 ground for dishonor
depending on whether the document of title is presented through
banking channels. Finally, it does not draw illogical distinctions be-
tween letter of credit transactions which involve bills of lading subject
to the F.B.L.A., and those which involve bills of lading subject to
Article Seven.
C. Applying the Section 7-507(b) Ground for Dishonor
To discover the proper application of the section 7-507(b) ground
for dishonor, it remains only to combine the results of the above anal-
yses of sections 7-507(b) and 5-114(2). The same model transaction
discussed previously in this article will be used to illustrate. Again,
assume the seller knows that a small but not insignificant number of
the apples to be sold are wormy. In section 7-507(b) jargon, this gives
him knowledge of a fact which impairs the worth of any document of
title he obtains in exchange for the apples. Therefore, although the
document of title complies on its face with the letter of credit's terms,
it does not conform to one of the "warranties made on negotiation or
transfer of a document of title."' 56 Under section 5-114(2), then, the
issuer may dishonor, and the buyer seek an injunction, regardless of
whether the section 7-507(b) warranty is actually made, or to whom it
is made.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECTION 7-507(b)
GROUND FOR DISHONOR
As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, the practical conse-
quence of the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor is that an issuer or
56. This model transaction happens to involve goods which are defective, but the nature and
quantity of which are accurately represented in the document of title. The § 7-507(b) ground for
dishonor could also apply where the nature or quantity of the goods is misrepresented in such a way
as to suggest the document of title covers more valuable goods than is in fact the case. Any degree of
misrepresentation suffices so long as the worth of the document of title is impaired.
19861
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its customer may achieve dishonor even in cases where a defect in the
goods, or a misdescription in the document of title, is relatively mi-
nor, so long as the defect or misdescription is sufficient to impair the
worth of the document of title. The conceptual consequences of the
section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor are less clear.
In those jurisdictions where fraud must be egregious to constitute
a ground for dishonor, only a severe defect in the goods, or a gross
misrepresentation in the document of title covering the goods, justifies
relief. By choosing to limit dishonor to instances of egregious fraud,
these jurisdictions manifested their belief in the importance of the in-
dependence principle, and their determination that the principle
should be preserved in as pure a form as possible. However, these
same jurisdictions must allow dishonor in the case of a lesser defect or
misrepresentation, so long as the issuer or customer is clever enough
to assert section 7-507(b), rather than fraud, as a ground for dishonor.
Thus, in such jurisdictions, the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor
introduces a conceptual inconsistency into section 5-114(2), and cuts
a gaping hole in the independence principle, as it is currently
understood.
On the other hand, some scholars argue that common law fraud,
rather than egregious fraud, is the standard for dishonor adopted by
section 5-114(2). In other words, any knowing material misrepresen-
tation, made with the intention of inducing reliance, constitutes a
ground for dishonor. This interpretation of the fraud ground for dis-
honor is reminiscent of the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor,
which applies where the person negotiating or transferring the docu-
ment of title has knowledge of a fact impairing its validity or worth. 57
Under both grounds for dishonor, whether the misrepresentation is
egregious is irrelevant; what matters is the presence of scienter. 58
Why did the drafters 9 of section 5-114(2) include the section 7-
507(b) ground for dishonor? Did they fail to realize that the fraud
and section 7-507(b) grounds for dishonor were conceptually inconsis-
tent, or did they have some reason for believing the two grounds to be
57. See Symons, supra note 2, at 367-68.
58. "Scienter" has been defined as knowledge or belief that a representation is false, or that
there is insufficient information to support the representation. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
59. In 1940, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which had
previously drafted such uniform commercial acts as the U.S.A., U.B.L.A., and U.W.R.A., adopted a
proposal to draft a comprehensive commercial code. In 1944, the American Law Institute agreed to
co-sponsor the project. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 2-3.
[Vol. 6:1
HeinOnline  -- 6 J.L. & Com. 16 1986
LETTERS OF CREDIT
conceptually compatible? Unfortunately, research into the drafting
history of section 5-114(2) produces no clear answers to these
questions.
In 1941, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) was engaged in the task of revising the
Uniform Sales Act. Section 36 of the U.S.A., one of the precursors of
section 7-507 of the U.C.C., was amended by the addition of the fol-
lowing subsection:
(2) A seller who negotiates or transfers a document of title to a
banker, or causes it to be so negotiated, and thereby induces the banker
to make payment of or advances on the price, thereby makes to the
banker the warranties described in subsection l(a), (b), (c) and (d), and
also warrants the genuineness of all documents presented which are re-
quired to accompany the document of title, and the truth of all state-
ments about the goods contained in any invoice so required.
But neither the warranty in subsection l(c) nor the warranty of
truth of statements in the invoice may be used by the banker as a defense
against an obligation incurred by him to the seller to make tentative pay-
ment against documents, unless the character of the breach of warranty
be so gross as to make out deliberate fraud . . .6
The comment appended to this draft provision explained that
subsection (2):
state[d] the case-law, so far as concerns the barring of discrepancy of
quality and minor defect in the goods from being a defense under a
banker's credit when the documents conform . . . . The fact is, that
only extraordinary circumstances have any business to excuse payment
when the documents do conform. The fact is, also, that bare-faced fraud
should be enough so to excuse. 61
The express limitation of dishonor to instances of gross breach of
the warranty of truth of statements in the invoice, or the subsection
1(c) warranty, was believed necessary to eliminate the possibility of
dishonor for minor defects in the goods. The warranty contained in
subsection 1(c) of section 36 is a predecessor of the section 7-507(b)
warranty; it provided "that he [the person negotiating or transferring
the document of title] has knowledge of no fact which would impair
the validity or worth of the document. ' 62 Thus, there is evidence that
60. N.C.C.U.S.L., Report and Second Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act § 36(2) (1941),
reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 453 (E. Kelly ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C. DRAFTS].
61. Id. Comment on § 36, reprinted in I U.C.C. DRAFrS at 454.
62. Id. § 36(1)(c), reprinted in I U.C.C. DRAFTS at 453.
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the revisors of section 36 were aware that permitting dishonor where
there was knowledge of a fact impairing the validity or worth of the
document of title would result in permitting dishonor for defects in
the goods which were not egregious.
As the process of drafting the U.C.C. got underway with the help
of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.), later provisions retained and
broadened this limitation upon the ability to dishonor:
An issuer is not excused from honor by the fact that the goods or
documents do not conform to the underlying contract for sale or to the
warranties described in Section 67(1) of the Uniform Revised Sales Act;
but as against any person it is excused by falsity of or failure of title to
any document required as a condition and is also excused against a seller
or consignor by such a non-conformity as amounts to a failure of
consideration. 63
The corresponding draft of section 67(1) of the Uniform Revised
Sales Act (U.R.S.A) incorporated the warranties of section 66, 64 a
predecessor of section 7-507:
Where a person negotiates or transfers a document of title for value
otherwise than as a mere intermediary under Section 68, then unless
otherwise agreed he warrants to his purchaser in addition to any war-
ranty made in selling the goods
(a) that the document is genuine; and
(b) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair its
validity or worth; and
(c) that his negotiation or transfer is rightful and fully effective
with respect to the title to the document and the goods it represents. 65
Still later drafts provided that any failure of the documents to
63. A.Ll. & N.C.C.U.S.L., The Code of Commercial Law (Latest Drafts of Six of the Articles
of the Commercial Code), Article IV, Chapter 1, § 22 (1948), reprinted in 5 U.C.C. DRAFrS 379-80
(emphasis added).
64. Section 67(1) provided:
Any person who procures issuance of a document of title or other third party document
and so deals with it that payment or advances are at any time made against it or against a
draft or claim which it secures warrants to each person who makes such payment or advances
but only to the extent thereof
(a) all the facts warranted under Section 66; and
(b) the genuineness of any document which he causes to accompany the document of
title; and
(c) the truth of all representations made in the document of title, including any de-
scription therein purporting to be the description of the goods, or made by him in his invoice
or any other accompanying documents.
Id. U.R.S.A. § 67(1), reprinted in 5 U.C.C. DRAFTS at 265.
65. Id. U.R.S.A. § 66, reprinted in 5 U.C.C. DRAFTS at 265.
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conform to "the warranties implied from dealing with documents of
title" did not constitute grounds for dishonor.66 Although the "war-
ranties implied from dealing with documents of title" were not identi-
fied with greater specificity, in light of the previous drafting history, it
seems a fair inference that the phrase included the three warranties
which were eventually contained in section 7-507 of the UCC.
The 1957 Official Text of the UCC marked a sudden reversal of
this consistent drafting policy. For the first time, failure of a required
document to conform to the section 7-507 warranties became a
ground for dishonor. 67 One searches in vain for any explanation of
this critical change.68 It is possible that the drafters were responding
to a criticism made in a study of the letter of credit provisions of the
U.C.C. commissioned by the New York Law Revision Commission. 69
66. E.g., A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code: May 1949 Draft § 4-116 (1949),
reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 518; A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code: Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition § 5-120 (Spring 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C. DRAFTS 200. This
language was later shortened to "the warranties implied from dealing with documents." A.L.I. &
N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code: Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition § 5-111(l)
(1952), reprinted in 15 U.C.C. DRAFTs 17.
67. A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code: 1957 Official Text With Comments
§ 5-114(2) (1957), reprinted in 19 U.C.C. DRAFTS 481.
68. The following sources were researched: U.C.C. Editorial Board, Recommendations of the
Editorial Board for Changes in the Text of the Uniform Commercial Code (December 29, 1952),
reprinted in 15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 351; U.C.C. Editorial Board, Recommendations of the Editorial
Board for Changes in the Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft, Text
and Comments Edition (April 20, 1952), reprinted in 15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 367; U.C.C. Enlarged Edi-
torial Board, Recommendations of the Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments of the
Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition (April 30, 1953), reprinted in
15 U.C.C. DRAFrs 391; U.C.C. Enlarged Editorial Board, Recommendations of the Editorial Board
for Changes in the Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft, Text and
Comments Edition (June 1, 1953), reprinted in 15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 419; A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L.,
Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition 1952, with Changes and
Modifications Approved by the Enlarged Editorial Board at Meetings Held on December 29, 1952,
February 16, 1953, May 21, 1953 and December 11, 1953 (1954), reprinted in 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 1
and 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS 1; A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of
Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code (January 1955), reprinted in 17 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 307; A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code (1956), reprinted in 18 U.C.C. DRAFTS 1; N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of
the Law Revision Commission for 1954 and Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code
(1954); N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1955: Study of the
Uniform Commercial Code (1955); N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Com-
mission for 1956: Report Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code (1956).
69. The first official text of the U.C.C. appeared in 1952. In 1953, the governor of New York
assigned to the New York Law Revision Commission the task of preparing a study of the U.C.C. I
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1954 and Record of Hear-
ings on the Uniform Commercial Code 7 (1954). In the course of this study, the Commission con-
ducted public hearings, received memoranda and correspondence from prominent scholars, lawyers,
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The study complained that section 5-111(1) of the 1952 Official Text
of the U.C.C. was "hopelessly ambiguous" with regard to the issuer's
ability to dishonor without liability to the beneficiary, where there
was forgery or fraud in a required document.70 The confusion, the
study argued, stemmed from the language prohibiting dishonor where
a document failed to conform to the "warranties implied from dealing
with documents":
It would have been easy to say that an issuer is not excused from
honor by the fact that there is a forgery or fraud or alleged forgery or
fraud in a document apparently regular on its face. But the Code does
not use such simple language. It says that the issuer is not excused from
honor by the fact that the documents "do not conform . . . to the war-
ranties implied from dealing with documents." The reference is perhaps
to the warranties stated in Section 5-110(1), and with respect to docu-
ments of title in Sections 7-507 and 7-508. Without going into a detailed
analysis of these sections, one gathers from merely reading them that a
beneficiary who personally has manufactured a forged or fraudulent doc-
ument would be held liable for breach of a warranty; and it is arguable,
though not certain, that such warranty would be regarded as one "im-
plied for dealing with documents." '71
This commentary implied an identity between documents which
failed to conform to the "warranties implied from dealing with docu-
ments" and forged or fraudulent documents. Perhaps this implication
persuaded the drafters of the U.C.C. that they could safely secure the
issuer's option to dishonor when forged or fraudulent documents were
presented by eliminating the criticized language and adding section 7-
507 as a new basis for dishonor. But, did the drafters realize that,
although there was some overlap between documents which failed to
conform to the section 7-507 warranties and forged or fraudulent doc-
uments, the two were not necessarily identical? Did they realize that,
by adding the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor, they were setting
up a standard for dishonor which was inconsistent with an egregious
fraud standard?
and businessmen, commissioned studies of individual articles of the U.C.C., and finally issued a
report, approving some provisions and criticizing others. The drafters of the U.C.C. responded by
extensively revising the 1952 Official Text. Many of their revisions were inspired by the Commis-
sion's study. See generally A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of
Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code (January 1955), reprinted in 17 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 307; A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code (1956), reprinted in 18 U.C.C. DRAFMS 1.
70. 3 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1955: Study of
the Uniform Commercial Code 1664 (1955).
71. Id.
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Symons suggests that, by adding the section 7-507(b) ground for
dishonor, the drafters indicated their intent to allow dishonor in cases
of knowing misconduct falling short of egregious fraud.72 This inter-
pretation of the drafters' intent receives some weak support from the
fact that, at least in 1941, there was a realization on the part of the
N.C.C.U.S.L. that allowing dishonor for breach of the section
36(l)(c) warranty of the U.S.A. (the model for the section 7-507(b)
warranty) would open the door to dishonor based on defects in the
goods which were not egregious. However, it is also possible that the
drafters simply failed to realize, sixteen years later, that by incorpo-
rating section 7-507(b) into section 5-114(2), they were creating a
ground for dishonor which was conceptually inconsistent with an in-
tended egregious fraud standard for dishonor. In the absence of hard
evidence, any attempt to divine the drafters' intent in adding the sec-
tion 7-507(b) ground for dishonor, and thereby determine whether
section 5-114(2) is internally consistent, remains sheer speculation.
CONCLUSION
The section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor has received little
scholarly or judicial attention. This seems strange in view of its wide-
ranging ramifications. As a practical matter, it makes dishonor possi-
ble where a seller knows that the goods he shipped are defective, or
that the document of title covering the goods contains a misrepresen-
tation, where the defect or misrepresentation impairs the document of
title's worth. As a conceptual matter, it conflicts with the fraud
ground for dishonor also included within section 5-114(2), at least in
the many jurisdictions adopting the egregious fraud standard.
This writer has some misgivings regarding the advisability of the
section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor. The role of the letter of credit
device as a means of guaranteeing payment to an anxious beneficiary
must be kept firmly in mind. Traditionally, the independence princi-
ple has served to safeguard this role. Yet, the section 7-507(b) ground
for dishonor seriously weakens the independence principle by al-
lowing dishonor for defects or misrepresentations which are not egre-
gious. Some might claim that the difficulty of proving knowledge of
the defect or misrepresentation prevents wholesale destruction of the
principle. 73 However, where the defect or misrepresentation is patent,
such knowledge may be readily inferred. Furthermore, this damage
72. Symons, supra note 2, at 368.
73. See id. at 381.
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to the independence principle is not offset by any pressing need to
protect the issuer or customer from the heinous acts of the beneficiary
by allowing dishonor. Where a defect or misrepresentation is not
egregious, the issuer's security interest in the goods and document of
title is not seriously impaired, nor will the customer sustain any heavy
financial loss.
Those twin guardians of the U.C.C., the A.L.I. and the
N.C.C.U.S.L., would be well advised to consider whether the section
7-507(b) ground for dishonor should be eliminated from section 5-
114(2). Even if the section 7-507(b) ground for dishonor is retained,
clarification of the present ambiguous language of section 5-114(2),
which causes needless confusion as to the ground's proper applica-
tion, would be helpful.
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